During the 2nd siege of Fallujah, Coalition forces characterized their operation as a “liberation” of the people of Fallujah. Thus, they made a distinction between the civilians of Fallujah, who they claimed to be saving, and the resistance in Fallujah, who they claimed were oppressing the civilians. However, this distinction appears to have only been part of the official rhetoric. According to eyewitness accounts from US veterans, journalists, and aid organizations, the operation itself was indiscriminate on many levels.
Sometime after the 1st siege of Fallujah, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the new pretext for US-led aggression in Fallujah. In his book, Inside Fallujah, Ahmed Mansour wrote of this period that,
“[t]he hunt for al-Zarqawi began an endless cycle if Fallujah: American forces would bomb a civilian house and declare they’d just bombed an al-Zarqawi hideout; reporters would snap pictures and shoot footage of dead civilians; and the phantom al-Zarqawi would not be found. The bombings intensified in July and reached their peak in mid-October”.
US forces were unable to kill or capture all resistance fighters in Fallujah, as was their goal, during the first siege. Eventually they had to negotiate a withdrawal from the city. An agreement was made between US forces and the leadership in Fallujah that a ceasefire would be called, US forces would withdraw from the city limits of Fallujah, and Fallujah would be placed in charge of its own security. This led to the creation of the Fallujah brigade. 
The 1st siege of Fallujah began on April 5th, when US forces sealed off all entrances and exits to and from the city, trapping its 300,000 residents in the line of fire. However, US forces underestimated the capabilities of the resistance, who killed 36 US servicemen in the course of the operation.
In Part 3 we showed that the resistance in Fallujah was not motivated by irrational anti-American sentiments, nor were they motivated by religious teachings that taught them to hate and kill infidels, as the mainstream media would have us believe. Rather, the resistance in Fallujah sought to defend their city from American aggression and to fight for their sovereignty.
Although there was resistance to the US-led invasion of Iraq in some Iraqi cities, Fallujah remained peaceful. Coalition forces largely ignored Fallujah. They regarded it as having little strategic importance and focused their efforts on Baghdad.
In Part 1 we established that there was no casus belli (just cause for war) to justify the invasion of Iraq, the US and UK governments consciously deceived their people into thinking that Saddam Hussein had WMDs, and therefore the invasion of Iraq was illegal.
In this post we will analyze another justification provided for the invasion of Iraq: that the invasion of Iraq was for humanitarian purposes.
For the next several weeks, the Justice For Fallujah Project will be making a series of posts reexamining the official reasons and arguments given by the US for its policy in Fallujah. By looking at eyewitness testimony, declassified government documents, and alternative media coverage of these events, we hope to expose the fallacies and misinformation that mislead the American public about what their country did to Fallujah.